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Walmart’s Sustainability Journey: 
Andy Ruben and the Design of Organizational Structures and Systems (A) 
 
On October 24, 2005, Andy Ruben listened attentively to Walmart CEO Lee Scott's passionate 
speech, ―Leadership for the 21st Century.‖ Over the past year he had worked closely with Scott 
to define the company's ambitious sustainability strategy, so he was not particularly surprised by 
the speech‘s contents; still, he felt awed as Scott publically announced, for the very first time, 
Walmart‘s remarkable sustainability goals: to be 100% supplied by renewable energy; to create 
zero waste; and to sell products that sustain the world‘s resources and environment.  
 
Ruben had accepted the role of Vice President of Strategy and Sustainability at Walmart several 
months earlier, and Scott‘s very public speech added a sense of gravity and urgency to the work 
ahead. Just moments before the speech, Scott had asked Ruben, ―Will this work?‖ Even as he 
reassured Scott, Ruben thought,  
In reality, there isn‘t a person on this planet who could definitely answer that 
question ‗yes.‘ Who could predict how 1.6 million Walmart associates would react? 
Would they view this as a call to action? Would they view our CEO as 
disconnected? Or worse yet, how would customers respond? How would our board 
respond? What would the press write about it?
i
  
Andy Ruben knew that he would be spending the next few years discovering answers to these 
questions. He faced the immediate challenges of building an emergent sustainability office to 
lead the efforts of turning Lee Scott‘s ambitious vision into operable activities and measurable 
Organizational Structures and Systems (A) 
Page 2 
outcomes. Grasping his colossal undertaking, Ruben was aware that his first decisions in shaping 
the organizational structures and systems of the new sustainability strategy would be critical—
and might very well mean the difference between success and failure over the long run. The job 
seemed mammoth, but Ruben believed that the payoffs could be equally enormous. 
Andy Ruben’s Journey to Sustainability 
A native of Columbus, Ohio, Andy Ruben earned his bachelor‘s degree in civil engineering, and 
then pursued his master‘s in business administration in 1996 from Washington University in St. 
Louis. Before his marriage and the arrival of his two children, Ruben backpacked halfway across 
the Earth, from the southern tip of Chile to Alaska—without any inkling that in a few years it 
would be his job to help preserve the land he trekked.
ii
 When Ruben began his business career, 
he served as a founding member of Ernst & Young‘s Strategy Practice, before joining Walmart 
as Director of Corporate Strategy in 2002. By 2003, he had been promoted to Vice President of 
U.S. Strategy.  
 
Ruben became involved in sustainability efforts at Walmart in June 2004, after Lee Scott hired 
Conservation International (CI) and a nascent sustainability consultancy, Blu Skye, run by Jib 
Ellison, to measure Walmart‘s environmental impact. Scott asked Ruben to work closely with 
Ellison to consider how Walmart could institute changes. Ellison remembered Ruben as a critical 
leader in recruiting and seeking out passionate advocates within Walmart who could help 
jumpstart the sustainability program: 
He was a young guy in the strategy group helping Lee with a variety of special 
projects of which this became one, and he was an early adopter intellectually and 
emotionally. So he became early on the guy who we would call on the phone every 
day and talk to inside the business, and he became increasingly enthusiastic about it 
as a business strategy. He became the guy who is running around all over the place 
in the business, outside the business. He was really the chief enrollment officer at 
the time.
iii
 
As initial conversations began, Ruben and his team faced the constant challenge associated with 
the vast number of opportunities for improvement that a company of Walmart‘s size could 
pursue. As the world‘s largest retailer, Walmart hosted more than 120 million U.S. consumers 
every week;
iv
 its 2005 U.S. revenues exceeded those of the next five largest retailers combined 
(Home Depot, Kroger, Sears Holding Company [which includes Sears and Kmart], Costco, and 
Target).
v
 In both domestic and international markets, in 2005 Walmart served more than 138 
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million customers each week in approximately 1,500 stores that employed more than 1.6 million 
people. Walmart‘s worldwide data centers also tracked approximately 68 million stock-keeping 
units weekly. International sales in 2005 contributed more than $56 billion, such that Walmart‘s 
global revenue for that fiscal year reached $285 billion (see Exhibit 1).
vi
 
 
This scale and scope presented both opportunities and challenges for Walmart‘s sustainability 
efforts. On the one hand, even minor improvements could have large-scale impacts, considering 
its massive global supply chain and customer base. On the other hand, implementing 
sustainability projects throughout such an enormous organization would be an intensive 
undertaking. The hope was that new projects would be consistent with Walmart‘s long-standing 
business mission to provide everyday low prices to its customers, but Ruben and his colleagues 
remained unsure about what Walmart realistically could accomplish. No company the size of 
Walmart had ever undertaken to achieve the types of sustainability goals that Lee Scott had 
publically announced for the company.  
 
Ruben recalled the questioning and experimentation that characterized early sustainability 
discussions: 
I can barely describe how many nights were spent just hashing it out and fighting 
and arguing about how we were going live up to our potential. In these rooms were 
smart, passionate people arguing about what to do.… How are we possibly going to 
figure this stuff out? At some point we realized that every time someone at 
Walmart makes a decision, there are 100 unintended consequences. And there‘s no 
one person who‘s ever going to get all those. So our goal became to help every 
business leader understand more of the unintended consequences so they would 
simply make better business decisions. Our focus couldn‘t be about the business 
decisions but rather how we would interject sustainability thinking into the business 
when you‘ve got a million and a half people internally, and hundreds of millions of 
people having that system‘s viewpoint externally?... I think those holy-cow 
moments pushed us to figure out how to deliver on that in new ways.
vii
 
Long conversations and breakthrough moments contributed to Ruben‘s, and the broader Walmart 
community‘s, growing understanding of the potential for a sustainability strategy. Early meetings 
served as storytelling forums about successful innovations and programs. Ruben hoped to 
produce a few narratives that demonstrated how Walmart could add value not only to customers 
and shareholders but also to the broader environment and society as a whole. Ruben was stunned 
by the results of this effort: ―We did end up with those stories; but instead of three to four, we 
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had hundreds of them.‖ Early successes at Walmart initiated a virtuous cycle of innovation; one 
person‘s story encouraged others to explore what might be accomplished elsewhere.  
 
As he learned more, Ruben increasingly came to view the sustainability movement as an 
important strategic opportunity for Walmart. After reading Paul Hawken‘s Ecology of 
Commerce
viii
 and Adam Werbach‘s speech, The Death of Environmentalism,ix on a plane trip 
with Jib Ellison to the United Kingdom, he experienced a ―personal epiphany that sustainability 
was the single most important strategy that we could take on as a company.... Put up against any 
strategy in any way, this was the single largest opportunity that we would have.‖ He eventually 
came to consider the potential benefits of a sustainability strategy at Walmart as equal in 
importance to the other significant bets that marked Walmart‘s history:  
To give you a sense of how I think about strategy, we need to go back to Walmart 
in 1962 when we opened up a discount store in rural America. At the time, 
everyone told [Sam Walton] he was a fool. ‗That‘ll never work. You‘ve got to be in 
a big city. There‘s no market in Alliance, Nebraska.‘ And he said ‗no, I think there 
is.‘ So strategy was about looking for those opportunities the rest of the world 
wasn‘t seeing, because if the world was seeing it, it probably wasn‘t that great of an 
opportunity. 
And if you fast forward to 1992, we start expanding Walmart from just the 
Midwest. And we couldn‘t figure out how to get the right products in the right 
stores for specific markets that were so far from Arkansas. So we said, ‗boy, the 
only way we‘re going figure this out is if we start sharing all the sales data with our 
suppliers because P&G will just start spending more time trying to understand 
where you sell more Tide and where you put what items than we can.‘ At that 
point, though, retailers didn‘t share data with suppliers. You don‘t do that. That‘s 
your proprietary data. So again, no one‘s doing it. It sounds a little crazy.x  
To Ruben, a sustainability strategy offered the same type of ―a little crazy‖ approach to 
identifying strategic opportunities. Walmart‘s historical focus on everyday low cost meant that it 
led the world in achieving efficiencies in logistics, operations, and product sourcing, but Ruben 
believed that a sustainability initiative also could invigorate Walmart to see  
…how much is being left on the table, to realize you‘re just starting to scratch the 
surface. And at the same time, there‘s so much value created, just like there was in 
opening a discount store in rural America by serving people‘s needs. There‘s all 
this value to be created and therefore an incredible business opportunity because 
you add that value. 
Despite Walmart‘s well-known reputation for efficiency, Ruben came to consider Walmart as 
―the lowest cost of a bunch of high-cost operators.‖ While performing well in comparison to its 
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peers, the company still had room for radical improvements to meet the growing demands of 
sustainable development. 
 
In the summer of 2005, Lee Scott tapped Ruben to become the first Vice President of Strategy 
and Sustainability at Walmart. Ruben had previously turned down the offer twice, believing that 
a leadership role in sustainability would eventually hurt his career: ―I was trying to figure out 
what I had done wrong in strategy that Lee Scott wanted me to go do environmental work.‖ After 
he learned more about the potential of a sustainability strategy, Ruben finally accepted the job 
when Scott insistently offered it to him a third time. He never regretted his decision; his work 
leading Walmart‘s early sustainability efforts soon became ―the most meaningful and exciting 
three years of my professional life.‖ 
Designing Organizational Structures and Systems 
As Vice President of U.S. Strategy, Ruben‘s job had been to envision new opportunities for 
Walmart. As the first Vice President of Sustainability, his new job was to design the 
organizational structures and systems that would enable the desired strategy to be implemented 
in practice. The critical difference between these positions was ―the difference between 
theoretical strategy and actually creating the change.‖ In his sustainability role, Ruben needed to 
find a way to implement a new strategic direction across a vast organization:  
I think the more that sustainability unfolded, the hard part wasn‘t to see that it 
would be important. The hard part was believing that the leadership and 
organization would really be there to support it. Would we actually be able to find 
our path through this as a core-business strategy? Would the organization and 
everyone else be able to get behind it and support it and do it the way that would 
allow it to work? These are big questions.  
A challenge to Ruben‘s efforts to seek answers to these questions was that Scott‘s ―21st Century 
Leadership‖ speech had ended the period of under-the-radar experimentation and trial that had 
characterized earlier sustainability efforts. On October 24, 2005, Scott‘s talk reached 1.6 million 
Walmart associates in all of its 5,000-plus stores worldwide, as well as its more than 60,000 
suppliers. Scott presented a long-term agenda to make ―the earth a better place,‖ acknowledging 
that his sustainability goals were ―both ambitious and aspirational, and I‘m not sure how to 
achieve them … at least not yet.‖  
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The task of transforming Scott‘s grand vision into operable structures and systems would fall to 
Ruben. Although the public nature of Scott‘s speech provided substantial credibility to initial 
sustainability efforts, as well as promises of growing resource support within Walmart, it also 
inevitably meant increased scrutiny and accountability. Ruben knew that both external activists 
and internal associates would be carefully watching Walmart‘s actions, trying to evaluate 
whether Scott‘s speech represented a credible commitment to long-term change or a short-term 
public relations effort. 
 
To initiate a pathway toward achieving Walmart‘s ambitious sustainability vision, Ruben needed 
to develop a strategy about what should be done, who should decide, and in what order and 
speed. Four key tasks required immediate attention: designing a sustainability office to guide the 
organization in its new endeavors; developing a strategic planning process to identify and 
implement new programs and initiatives; formulating stakeholder engagement strategies to bring 
new ideas and perspectives into the organization; and initiating educational efforts to develop 
and spread new mindsets and skills throughout the organization. 
The Sustainability Office 
The first task Ruben faced was to organize the emergent sustainability office, particularly in 
defining the relationship between the new office and the rest of the organization. Should he 
develop a strong, centralized sustainability group to define and implement strategic priorities in 
sustainability programs, or should he continue with the bottom-up style of experimentation and 
trial that had characterized strategic decision making so far? The early successes of Walmart‘s 
sustainability program had not resulted from a top-down strategic planning process. Instead, 
Scott had brought talented and passionate people together and encouraged them to engage in new 
conversations about how a sustainability mindset could change the ways that Walmart conducted 
business. 
 
However, Ruben worried that the same culture of bottom-up experimentation and trial might not 
function well in the face of the public scrutiny certain to follow Scott‘s announcement of 
Walmart‘s ambitious sustainability strategy. Centralizing decision-making authority into the 
sustainability office would allow him and his team more direct control over resources and 
expertise in choosing and supervising new programs and initiatives. Yet, despite the benefits of a 
highly centralized, controlled decision-making process, he was concerned that a strong central 
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sustainability office would cause organizational members to view the sustainability strategy as 
separate from their daily operations or the company‘s key business focus. 
 
Ultimately, Ruben hoped to lead a transformative strategy that enacted change ―through the 
organization rather than to the organization,‖ in line with his belief that Walmart‘s full potential 
could be achieved only if sustainability were integrated into its core business mission. However, 
Ruben also understood that the demands for quick and measurable results might require more 
direct control and oversight over sustainability activities, to ensure that measurable, focused 
results could be achieved, and then communicated, effectively.  
 
These initial decisions about the design of strategic processes had clear implications for the 
structure of the sustainability office. If he planned to decentralize authority into the business 
itself, a smaller office would be needed. In this case, the primary purpose of the sustainability 
office would be to introduce new knowledge and perspectives to those within the organization 
who ultimately would decide which sustainability goals and projects were most appropriate to 
their own circumstances. In contrast, a more centralized strategy would require a larger 
sustainability office that possessed more substantive expertise and project management skills. 
With this option, the members of the sustainability office would lead, rather than consult in, 
efforts to identify, implement, and evaluate new programs.  
 
Ruben had already hired some full-time sustainability staff members before Scott‘s speech, 
including Tyler Elm, who had experience running similar sustainability change efforts at Office 
Depot. But the new announcement required rethinking the overall mission of the sustainability 
office to match the ambition of Scott‘s public vision. How large should the sustainability office 
grow? How many more personnel would be required? And how should he define the roles of the 
representatives of this office: as strategic planners, public relation experts, technical experts, 
facilitators, educators, or innovators?  
Programs and Processes 
As well as designing the structure of the sustainability office, Ruben and his team also needed to 
develop a strategic planning process by which potential initiatives across the corporation could 
be identified, evaluated and implemented. While Scott‘s speech had set out the long-term vision 
Organizational Structures and Systems (A) 
Page 8 
for sustainability at Walmart, an important next step was to clearly define and communicate what 
types of programs the new sustainability office would promote and support.   
 
In particular, Ruben hoped to actively manage time and aspirations in developing a portfolio of 
programs across the organization, as he understood that the success of the initiative would be 
evaluated over both the short and the long run. Both external and internal constituencies would 
demand measurable improvements quickly, so concrete goals within reasonable time frames 
needed to be established. Ruben did not want to set unrealistically demanding goals that might 
take years to accomplish, if they were achieved at all. However, if he moved too cautiously, he 
worried that Walmart associates might not be sufficiently challenged or motivated to strive 
toward Scott‘s aspirational vision of what the company could accomplish.  
 
To encourage the organization to seek innovative and ambitious initiatives, Ruben and his team 
differentiated between projects based on the scale and timing of their impact, distinguishing 
between: 
 Quick-wins that demonstrated business and environmental returns almost immediately; 
 Innovative projects that were designed for one to three-year payback windows; and 
 Game-changers that entailed radical departures from traditional business practices and 
required longer-term planning horizons with regard to both their implementation and 
their effects.  
The implementation of quick wins that promised immediate financial returns and positive 
environmental impact were important to build and sustain momentum throughout the 
organization, but Ruben hoped to balance the pursuit of short-term objectives with a concerted 
effort to develop innovative, large-scale projects that would allow the organization to reach more 
ambitious goals. 
 
Ruben believed that Walmart‘s response to Hurricane Katrina had already raised aspirations 
within the corporation about what could be achieved through a sustainability strategy. After 
Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans in August 2005, observers noted that Walmart was quicker to 
respond to the emergency conditions than many federal, state, or local government agencies. In 
comparison with the negative publicity it had been receiving at that time, Walmart enjoyed high 
praise for its effective and helpful efforts.
xi
 To Ruben, Walmart‘s response to Katrina illustrated 
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the organization‘s potential to take significant actions that moved beyond incremental changes 
over historical benchmarks: 
What Hurricane Katrina did was change the whole unit of measurement; we 
shouldn‘t focus only on performance compared to last year, but rather ask, ‗how are 
we doing against our potential?‘ It was, basically, saying don‘t be happy with three- 
or four-percent gains. Take the blinders off. What‘s the potential? And then, now 
that you feel like the gap is really big, go out and work with everybody you can 
possibly find who can help you get to that potential. 
If the company were truly to accept Scott‘s goals as serious, attainable objectives, Ruben 
believed its internal aspirations and recognition of what was possible had to be transformed: 
It would have been easier … to simply go after something that just looked good or 
felt good but didn‘t really grapple with our business model. We probably would 
have picked trucks because they‘re very tangible. And we would have taken out a 
big platform on making trucks more efficient. But at the end of the day, I don‘t 
think that that would have changed how Walmart saw itself. I don‘t think it would 
have changed our ability to work with people who had different viewpoints and 
actually get better from it. I don‘t think it would have changed how people thought 
about us as a global company instead of a retailer. 
In designing structures and systems, Ruben hoped to actively balance the pursuit of short-term 
objectives with continuing efforts to raise the aspirations of what could be accomplished over the 
long term.  
Stakeholder Engagement 
One strategy by which Ruben hoped to bring new ideas and skills into the organization was 
through an active effort to incorporate external stakeholders into strategic decision-making 
processes. He understood that a primary impetus for Walmart‘s environmental strategy was 
external stakeholder pressure related to a range of issues, from labor standards to health care to 
store sites and product sourcing. Walmart executives realized the need to improve the company‘s 
public reputation to maintain its ―license to grow,‖ both in the United States and abroad. Political 
and social issues continued to challenge Walmart‘s efforts to expand. 
 
For Ruben, the danger was that sustainability might be perceived solely as a public relations 
effort. He wanted to avoid this perception, especially in the early stages of the initiative, mainly 
for strategic reasons. In particular, there would be many nongovernmental (NGOs) and activist 
organizations seeking signs of failure or hypocrisy, so any public promises, beyond the broad 
goals initially set, might simply backfire: 
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Some people have more interest in not liking us than liking us, and there was 
nothing that we were going to tell them that was going to change their minds. So 
we might as well go do big things and take some big risks and reach our potential. 
Ultimately, he believed that Walmart‘s deeds, rather than its announcements, were the most 
effective response to potential critics, and he therefore wanted to focus on accomplishments 
rather than communications. To accomplish this goal, he hoped to evaluate each project 
independent of its media value:  
There was a litmus test that we used because there were ideas and efforts coming 
out of the woodwork. The litmus test was, if you want to go do ‗X,‘ would that be 
something that you would do if no one ever knew about it? And if the answer was 
yes, we‘d say, ‗full steam ahead, what do you need to go faster?‘ And if the answer 
was no, we‘d start to question whether that really fit within the strategy. And so we 
had to clearly separate things that would have a PR marketing benefit and a 
government-relations benefit from the true corporate strategy efforts. 
But Ruben‘s desire to avoid evaluating sustainability projects from a public relations perspective 
was also personal. Although he knew little about the natural environment at the start of the 
project, Ruben had become personally convinced that worldwide action on the environment was 
necessary to forestall long-term disaster. He hoped to lead an initiative that moved beyond image 
management to leverage Walmart‘s substantial resources and power to make real efforts in 
addressing important environmental issues, and he believed that similar moral motivations would 
influence others to commit similarly to sustainability efforts: 
People, I fundamentally believe, like to be part of something bigger than 
themselves. At the core we are social beings; and we like to work on things that are 
simply larger than ourselves. And sustainability offers that opportunity, as did 
Katrina. 
Ruben‘s goal was not just to avoid conflict with stakeholders but to change the way Walmart 
heard and listened to outside voices. Many of its earliest lessons had come about because the 
retailer had intently listened to new voices, such as representatives from environmental groups. 
Ruben also saw the powerful potential of stakeholders to push and invigorate corporate thinking 
beyond an incremental mindset, to brainstorm about what could be done anew:  
These are people who may dislike you, may disagree with you, will definitely have 
differing opinions, but can make you better. So go out, spend time with them, and 
then come back here better and more successful than before. 
His own early experiences in a multi-stakeholder meeting proved instructive:  
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There were a lot of uncomfortable moments. I remember early on one held at the 
Embassy Suites so it would be a neutral territory. We took a break, and I remember 
the thought in my mind as I was getting myself some coffee was, ‗gosh, I hope we 
haven‘t gotten in over our heads‘—because it was so uncomfortable. People 
weren‘t sure about why they were there. We have outsiders who showed up who 
couldn‘t understand why they were now meeting with Walmart. They weren‘t sure 
what they‘d gotten themselves into. And you had a group of Walmart executives 
that couldn‘t quite understand why they had showed up either. And we had all 
agreed to spend the next four hours together talking about hard topics. But I think 
having done that you walk away and realize that, actually, as painful as it was, 
you‘re better off for it. It laid the groundwork for a lot of what was to come.  
Although he recognized the potential for uncomfortable situations, Ruben could see that efforts 
to bring new players into the room for tough conversations had already proven successful. To 
Ruben, pushing the organization to listen to new ideas and engage in new conversations with 
external stakeholders was a critical part of any sustainability strategy designed to encourage 
innovative thinking that moved the organization in new directions.  
Sustainability Mindsets 
Ruben also considered the role of educational programs as an additional means to develop and 
spread new skills and expertise throughout the organization. He hoped to diffuse a new mindset 
that would enable associates to develop their own knowledge of sustainability, so that they could 
identify opportunities and evaluate prospects in their own areas of expertise. The organizational 
challenge to the development of new mindsets was that this task required more than 
communicating information through a lecture or a book: 
Mindset is one of the most challenging things to shift because I don‘t think you can 
force someone to change a mindset. But what we have done has been really 
effective. At a top level, they‘re basically field trips; you take people out of the 
conference room they‘re used to sitting in. A few examples: Jib Ellison and I were 
both with Lee Scott as we went to Vermont and collected sap with maple sugar 
farmers. It‘s not like reading a report. They‘re people talking about the trees you‘re 
standing among with stories of how they grew up and how maple trees no longer 
survive at this latitude. And then you can go and sift through massive amounts of 
data at the research center on top of Mount Washington. But the experience with 
the farmers is much richer. 
Walmart had a long-standing tradition of ―Eat What You Cook‖ trips, on which Walmart‘s 
buyers would take an entire day to go into a store or a supplier‘s operation to learn first-hand 
what customers were buying. Jib Ellison recalled that the sustainability team adopted the idea for 
their own purposes, calling them ―Sustainability Eat What You Cook‖ trips: 
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The purpose from the outset was to take these very busy senior executives out of 
their normal environment, take them to places that they would not normally go, to 
talk to people they would not normally talk to about things that they would not 
normally talk about, in the hope that it would create an intellectual understanding 
about what sustainability means and its relevance to the business, and emotionally 
touch them in such a way that they would be inspired to take action. 
These trips involved anyone in charge of an area, who then spent a day, several days, or even a 
week looking at products at the source—whether a corn field in Iowa or a cotton field in Turkey. 
Other excursions moved executives out of comfortable boardrooms so that they could experience 
first-hand the impacts of climate change on a single element of the environment. Ellison believed 
that the goal of fostering sustainability mindsets through field trips resonated well with 
Walmart‘s preexisting culture: 
Walmart is very interesting in that deep in the culture is a strong desire to ‗do the 
right thing.‘ So in the background of all the noise of the business model and how 
big they are, and everything else, it became very clear to me that for whatever 
reason, there was a strong desire, not well defined, to do the right thing. There‘s a 
strong part of that culture that really does feel like they are serving a societal 
benefit by providing everyday low price to those people in society who don‘t have 
access to goods and services, that don‘t have a lot of extra money to spend. So that 
was, I think, a very strong component of why this worked because we just tapped 
right in. We said, ‗look, you can do the right thing and save money. Look! You can 
do the right thing for your customers. You can do the right thing for the 
community. You can do the right thing for the world consistent with your business 
model.‘ 
Even as he was committed to shifting mindsets within Walmart, Ruben also recognized the 
importance of strengthening and extending the business case for sustainability. As the 
sustainability initiative grew, stakeholders would insist on a careful accounting of the business 
returns on the new expenditures. He also needed to develop solid financial reports for 
sustainability-inspired efforts, ―because the challenges and the opportunities in front of us were 
so much greater than the amount of funding that would ever be there from a public relations 
perspective. It just wouldn‘t be big enough to capture the opportunity.‖  
 
So how could Walmart balance environmental impact with business profitability? Ruben 
believed that he could provide ready justification for many quick-win solutions. But over the 
long haul, business decisions that weighed both near- and long-term implications were far more 
difficult. Developing sustainability mindsets to identify and seek new business opportunities thus 
was a critical component for any successful long-term strategy.  
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An Ambitious Undertaking 
Lee Scott‘s speech about Walmart‘s leadership in environmental sustainability was inspiring, 
leading Andy Ruben to contemplate closely the immensity, complexity, and vast promise of the 
task before him. The titanic opportunity was both thrilling and terrifying. Other executives would 
be looking to Ruben for leadership, in terms of setting project priorities and developing new 
strategic decision-making processes and goals. Instead of focusing on a single policy or program, 
Walmart‘s new Vice President of Strategy and Sustainability needed to think through how to 
initiate a sustainability strategy that implemented a portfolio of projects across multiple time 
frames and issue domains. He also had to decide quickly how to proceed, such that he could 
simultaneously lead change efforts in a controlled manner while encouraging experimentation 
and allowing for the inevitable mistakes associated with innovation. He also worried about his 
own career trajectory, especially if he took risks that proved unmanageable in the Walmart 
context. A daunting task certainly—but the rewards could be enormous for the company, for the 
planet, and for him. He hoped he made the right choices in forming and managing a 
sustainability office designed to facilitate the next stage of Walmart‘s sustainability journey. 
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